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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Non-party Appellants Duncan, et al. concur with and adopt the Reply Brief of Appellant 
TREMCO Legal Solutions, Inc. ("TREMCO"). The arguments and reply by TREMCO are accurately 
supported by the facts and the record herein. Appellants object to the Statements by Appellee 
Brigham Young University ("BYU ") because BYU's allegations are rife with conclusory innuendo 
neither supported by the record nor by the applicable standard of review. 
BYU's Brief fails to articulate or follow the standard of review appropriate to this appeal. 
BYU merely recites the general appellate review standards for all appeals regarding issues of law, 
fact and abuse of discretion. Their Statements and their entire Brief fail to observe that the 
applicable standard of review in these appeals is one of law. City of St. George v. Turner, 860 P.2d 
929, 932 (Utah 1993). Each of the district court's rulings depriving Appellants of their property 
without due process of law are reviewed for correctness. There was no trial and no proper factual 
findings by the district court. The facts and the record should be reviewed in the light most favorable 
to the Appellants. Hardy v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 763 P.2d 761 (Utah 1988); Spor v. 
Crested Butte Silver Min.f Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987). All evidence is liberally construed and 
all reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to Appellants. Caldwell 
v. Ford, Bacon and Davis Utah, Inc., Ill P.2d 483 (Utah 1989). 
After failing to adhere to the applicable review standard, BYU's statements are argumentative 
and conclusory. Appellee does not provide any record citations to support its characterizations of 
the "nature of the case." BYU simply attempts to show by force of its conclusions that this case 
presents the puzzle picture of a fish, yet when all the puzzle pieces are painstakingly examined and 
assembled the image is really of separate, distinct stars. Space and time do not permit examination 
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of all of BYU's factual and argumentative misstatements. TREMCO'S Reply Brief accurately 
discusses several major Appellee errors. We address only a few others. 
Most persuasive throughout its Brief is BYU's glib argument that separate and distinct 
corporate entities engaged in a common enterprise as an "unincorporated association" or joint 
venture. As clearly demonstrated in TREMCO'S Reply Brief, the corporate entities were separate and 
distinct, and corporate formalities were observed. (TREMCO Reply at pp.8-15; R. 827.) 
SoftSolutions, Inc. dissolved in 1992, well known to B YU, and did not continue in its normal 
business after its dissolution. B YU argumentatively asserts that "SoftSolutions" continued to engage 
in business, but does not cite to record evidence that supports its conclusory opinion. As noted in 
our prior Brief, a dissolved corporation is entitled to wind-up its affairs. There is no evidence in the 
record that SoftSolutions, Inc. engaged in any other activities after its dissolution other than to wind-
up its disputes and defend BYU's litigation claims in SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young 
University, 1 P.3d 1095, 2000 UT 46. The arbitrator's award and the judgment affirmed in 
SoftSolutions v. Brigham Young University was a judgment (R. 283-84) against the corporation 
SoftSolutions, Inc. in the process of winding-up its affairs. BYU well knew this fact when the 
SoftSolutions, Inc. judgment was entered. (R. 207.) The SoftSolutions, Inc. judgment was not 
sought or entered against some amorphous organization, as BYU deceptively argues. 
BYU falsely claims that the only asset of non-party SoftSolutions Technology Corporation 
("STCorp") was software "based on BYU's D-Search technology." (Appellee Brief at 5.) BYU well 
knows that the "assets" of STCorp were never transferred and that when STCorp stock was sold to 
WordPerfect by its non-party shareholders KWD, Julee, AST and the LDS Church, the valuable 
assets of STCorp remained in STCorp (R. 826, Ijl 8); and, that BYU's damaging algorithm had long 
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since been removed from STCorp's software products. SoftSolutions Inc. v. BYU, 2000 UT 46, |4 ; 
R. 1385645; Stock Purchase Agreement, R. 1264, 1263, 1261-1241. 
BYU's assertion that "TREMCO and others continued SoftSolutions' business . . . for years 
. . ." (Appellee Brief at 5) is likewise a totally false and conclusory allegation, unsupported by 
evidence or citation to the record, much less by undisputed "facts" before Judge Howard at the time 
of his May 14, 2002 Ruling (R. 1052-34), June 13, 2002 Judgment (R. 1057-54) and the July 10, 
2002 Supplemental Order (R. 1151-1140). {See R. 827-28.) 
When it entered into its "Exclusive License Agreement" with SoftSolutions, Inc. in June, 
1990, BYU knew full well that TREMCO, a separate corporate entity, held a separate and independent 
license to use BYU's faulty product. (SoftSolutions, Inc. License Agreement, 1J2.5, R. 240, 72; 
TREMCO License Agreement, R. 264-245.) TREMCO ceased using BYU's D-Search process in 
TREMCO's products in 1989 - before the SoftSolutions, Inc. License Agreement (R. 825). 
It is true that SoftSolutions Technology Corp. ("STCorp"), another separate corporation, 
received assignment of the SoftSolutions, Inc. "Exclusive License" right from SoftSolutions, Inc. 
and then utilized BYU's D-Search process in STCorp's software product until D-Search was 
removed in 1993. SoftSolutions, Inc., 1 P.3d at 1098, 2000 UT 46 at f4; R. 556-557, 829-827.) 
However, it is also clear that BYU never made STCorp a party to either litigation and has never 
sought to recover its claims from STCorp, even when STCorp continued in business after its stock 
was sold to WordPerfect and set aside a fund to pay BYU's claims. 
It is also significant to note what Appellee carefully avoids. Nowhere can BYU show that 
KWD Associates, L.C., Julee Associates, L.C. or AST Associates, L.C. were made parties to the 
litigation, had claims properly stated against them, were served with process or were permitted to 
defend their title and ownership to their own property. Nowhere were they, or the individuals 
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Duncan and Tedjamulia, allowed to appear and defend BYU's allegations and court's conclusion 
that they were members of an unincorporated association; that their individual property were really 
assets of an unincorporated, and also unsued, association; or, that the sale of corporate STCorp stock 
to WordPerfect in an unambiguous stock sale agreement was really a liquidation of corporate assets. 
Appellee does not show that Duncan, et al. were ever afforded the fundamental rights of due process 
to be named defendants, served process, participate in defense of their personal property interests, 
assert defenses and present evidence, or have their "day in court." (See Appellants' Brief at pp. 14-
18.) Nowhere does BYU show that the district court ever acquired personal or subject matter 
jurisdiction over Duncan, et al. or jurisdiction to adjudicate the ownership of the assets of STCorp's 
former shareholders. Without jurisdiction, the Court's Ruling and Judgment fail. See Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,110,89 S.Ct 1562 (1969); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer 
Works, 237 U.S. 413, 423, 35 S.Ct 625, 628 (1915). 
BYU claims that its July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order was intended to assist BYU as a 
supplemental order to the original SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment (Appellee Brief, p.22 at Tf59). Yet, 
BYU also concedes that the Supplemental Order was requested and sought by its Motion for 
Summary Judgment in the TREMCO case, and without any notice to the counsel of record of 
SoftSolutions, Inc., let alone the non-parties. (R. 959, 846, 1034, 1201.) Under either scenario, 
BYU had no business obtaining a void order in violation of the due process rights of Duncan, et al. 
and without notice to the counsel of record for SoftSolutions, Inc. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TREMCO JUDGMENT IS VOID AS AGAINST DUNCAN, ET 
AL. FOR LACK OF DUE PROCESS 
BYU's Appellee's Brief is telling in that it does not even attempt to argue that the non-party 
entities (who were the shareholders of non-party STCorp), or the non-party individuals (who were 
directors and officers of SoftSolutions, Inc. and of TREMCO), have been afforded fundamental due 
process. BYU does not claim that Duncan, et al. were ever made "John Does" or were ever named, 
impleaded, or served as parties as the Constitution and our legal system require. All BYU argues 
are erroneous conclusions that its post-judgment attachments are justified because Duncan, et al. are 
bound and liable by "privity" (Appellee Brief, p.31), that BYU is entitled to execute on the 
shareholders' proceeds from their sale of STCorp stock (Id., p.41), and the Duncan, et al. are 
association members (Id., p.44). How the district court can so rule without subject matter or 
personal jurisdiction over them is never explained. Essentially, BYU argues that whatever means 
it chooses to employ to accomplish its ends are justified, whether or not constitutional rights of 
others are respected. 
BYU provides no evidence that SoftSolutions, Inc. ever did any business after it assigned its 
license rights to STCorp and dissolved. SoftSolutions, Inc. created nothing, marketed nothing, sold 
nothing, negotiated nothing. It did wind-up its affairs by defending BYU's claim for unpaid 
royalties, as allowed by Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1405 (2001). Having obtained an assignment of 
BYU's license from SoftSolutions, Inc., STCorp created and marketed software. Under the 1998 
Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc., SoftSolutions, Inc. and, arguably, STCorp would be liable for 
BYU's Judgment. However, STCorp is not and has never been made a party, and no legal claim was 
ever asserted against it. 
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In similar cases, several courts have refused to allow judgment creditors to collect a judgment 
from the assets of non-parties or to hold non-parties automatically liable and subject to attachment 
and execution. BYU does not cite one case to the contrary in support of its efforts below. 
In Strick Corp. v. Thai Tech Products Co., Ltd., 493 F.Supp 1210 (D.C.Pa. 1980), the 
judgment creditor was not permitted to attach and satisfy its judgment against non-parties' assets on 
mere allegations of an alter-ego relationship. The court rejected the creditor's argument that 
Pennsylvania's Rule 69 hearing procedures afforded the nominal property owners adequate due 
process and the right to be heard. The property owners were not parties, and their property rights 
could not be eliminated from the balance simply because the judgment creditor alleged they were 
alter-egos. The need for such jurisdictional "safeguards" derives from concern for the Due Process 
Clause for "promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decision-making 
process." Id. at 1214, n.7. Obviously, Duncan, et al. have never been afforded such concerns 
regarding their properties. 
When a judgment creditor expanded its default judgment to include unnamed entities that 
the creditor alleged were "DBAs" of the named defendant, the judgment was held "null and void." 
Arsenault v. Gulf States Utilities Co., Inc., 482 So.2d 695, 697 (La. App. 1985). The trial court 
never acquired jurisdiction to enter a judgment against unnamed entities, whether or not alleged 
"DBAs." Such a judgment violated due process principles. 
In Mission Bay Campland, Inc. v. Sumner Financial Corp., 71 F.R.D. 432 (D.C.M.D. Fla. 
1976), a judgment creditor sought to satisfy its judgment by executing on the assets of non-parties 
on the theory that the non-parties had received "fraudulent transfers" from the debtor. The Federal 
District Court disallowed such tactics and held that "third persons who are non-parties must be 
impleaded both to acquire jurisdiction and to afford them essential elements of due process." Id at 
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435. The "essential elements" of due process included a hearing, after fair notice of the allegations 
against them, and an opportunity to present one's case. 
In the instant matter, BYU argues, without authority, that these fundamentals are provided 
because Duncan, et al. can request a post-attachment hearing under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
69. However, under the July 10 Supplemental Order and Rule 69, all the non-party may do is to 
claim "any exemption to the execution, or to challenge the issuance of the writ." Rule 69(h)(1), Utah 
R. Civil P. 
Served with BYU's writ of execution, purporting to execute on property of which Duncan, 
et al. are the legal and nominal owners, these non-parties are not afforded under Rule 69 any due 
process right to be heard and assert their defenses, including that Duncan, et al never engaged in 
business as, or were members of, an "unincorporated association," that BYU's claims against them 
are barred by the applicable limitation statutes, or that when STCorp stock was sold to WordPerfect 
in 1994 the STCorp assets were not "distributed in liquidation" as provided in Utah Code Ann. §16-
10a-1408(2001). 
These and other defenses are personal to these non-parties and they are entitled to due process 
protections before such defenses are decided against them personally without hearing or notice of 
their individual rights. Cf. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. at 423. (Before a non-party 
shareholder's property can be taken by a corporation's creditor, the shareholder is entitled to the most 
fundamental rights of a day in court and a hearing as to whether the claim is void for want of 
jurisdiction and other such defenses personal to the shareholder.) 
The plaintiff in Krofcheck v. Ensign Co., 112 Cal.App.3d 558, 169 Cal.Rprt. 516 (1980) 
obtained a judgment in Utah against the limited partnership Ensign Co. Registering that judgment 
in California, the plaintiff then tried to enforce the judgment against the non-party general partner 
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Robert Ensign, under the theory that the general partner "controlled" the Utah litigation. Similarly 
to the instant matter, the defendant entity had dissolved and was "judgment proof." California's 
court rejected plaintiffs attempt to enforce against the general partner the prior judgment against the 
partnership, and further stated that it is " . . . generally recognized that partners are not in such privity 
with one another that a judgment against one partner . . . is res judicata when the same issues are 
raised in subsequent litigation against another partner." Id. at 521. Moreover, a judgment against 
the partnership was not a judgment against the partners personally. Id. at 522. In the instant matter, 
B YU has not even sought or obtained a valid judgment against the alleged association, much less 
Duncan, et al. 
See also Valley Natl Bank of Ariz. v. A.E. Rouse & Co., 121 F.3d 1332 (9th Cir. 1997) (a 
judgment may not be entered or enforced against the assets of individual partners who were not 
parties to the action. The plaintiff must bring a separate action against the individual members of 
the debtor partnership); Lava Shadows, Ltd. v. Johnson, 121 N.M. 575, 915 P.2d 331 (Ct. App. 
1996) (just because a partnership is a defendant party to the action does not make a partner a party. 
A partner does not become a party merely by receiving notice of the action and does not "appear" 
or become a party merely by showing up at court proceedings). Applied to our B YU matter, not only 
were the trial court's rulings erroneous, they cannot bind Duncan, et al. or be used to execute upon 
their individual properties simply by declaring their assets to be "association" property. 
Even if the district court did not err in ruling that an "unincorporated association" existed 
between TREMCO and SoftSolutions, Inc., which Appellants strongly urge was error, the court could 
not then extend that ruling to include non-parties and their individual assets. To the extent the 
judgments against SoftSolutions, Inc. and/or TREMCO purport to bind unnamed Duncan, et al. or 
adjudicate their assets - by whatever theory as shareholders, officers, or alleged "joint venturers" -
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the judgment is void as violation of their due process rights. See Nisenzon v. Sadowski, 689 A.2s 
1037,1048 (R.I. 1997) (the expansion of relief in the judgment to include unnamed partners is void). 
BYU's reliance upon Steenblickv. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995) is misplaced because 
in Steenblick the individuals were defendants. All issues and allegations were fully tried to a jury. 
See also Rogers v. M. O. Bitner Co., 73 8 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1987) (determining a joint venture between 
parties and after a trial of facts). And, Steenblick only affirms liability when corporate officers 
continue the suspended corporation's "normal operations." Id. at 877. As noted above and cited in 
our Appellants' Briefs, there is no evidence that SoftSolutions, Inc. continued its "normal operations' 
after its dissolution, and its officers and directors never purported to conduct "normal operations." 
Asserting the contrary, BYU cites to several pages of the record. However, the record pages 
cited do not support BYU's conclusions. (Appellee's Brief, at 45.) Cited page "R. 2000.22" is a 
page from the original February 12,1998 Confirmation Ruling, where the district court stated, inter 
alia, that SoftSolutions, Inc. attempted to transfer its rights to STCorp in the early 1990's, and that 
"BYU briefed and argued before the arbitrator that STC was not dissolved when it was sold to 
WordPerfect as it was a stock sale of the corporation." (R. 2000.22 at n.9.) [Emphasis in original.] 
Cited record pages "1148-1149" are pages of BYU's July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order 
(which BYU also argues is not before this Court), in which the district court, conclusorily, adds 
"findings of fact" to impose liability upon Duncan, et al. and adjudicates ownership of the STCorp 
shareholders' individual assets. Record pages 338-334 are TREMCO'S Answer and Counterclaim in 
this matter, and provide no support for BYU's statement that an association "SoftSolutions continued 
operating" under the BYU license. 
BYU also relies upon general principles of res judicata and issue preclusion, without any 
analysis or authority to show how or why these doctrines apply to these non-parties, or how they 
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justify the relief that BYU says it requested in, and obtained from, its Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (See R. 854.) As shown by TREMCO'S Reply Brief, at p. 1, even if the SoftSolutions, Inc. 
judgment is res judicata, only the matters decided there would be binding - i.e. that only 
SoftSolutions, Inc., a Utah corporation, was liable under its license agreement with BYU. Properly 
applied, neither "issue preclusion" nor "claim preclusion" can bind non-parties to a determination 
that they are members of an unincorporated association, that their property was really association 
property, or that the sale of corporate stock was really a fraud on creditors. See PGM, Inc. v. 
Westchester Investment Partners, 995 P.2d 1252 (Utah App. 2000). BYU has not cited any authority 
to the contrary ofPGM, Inc., yet still uses the summaryjudgment as the basis to collect its judgment 
from non-parties, claiming they are "bound." 
Appellants have shown that each entity - SoftSolutions, Inc., SoftSolutions Technology 
Corporation, and TREMCO Consultants, Inc. - were separate and distinct corporations at the time 
when each transacted any business with the another and with BYU. At a minimum, there would 
exist relevant factual issues on the matter. Moreover, other than to just make a bare assertion, BYU 
fails totally to show undisputed facts that the defendants, or even the non-parties, "transacted 
business under a 'common name.'" BYU only asserts its summaryjudgment conclusions as though 
they were tried facts. And, as shown, there was no "undisputed" evidence in the record to establish 
how or why the sale of stock in a valid, existing corporation with substantial assets (both before and 
after the sale of the shares) was really a "distribution" of corporate "assets" in "liquidation" that 
violated Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1408 (2001). There is nothing in that statute, in the stock sale 
transaction itself (R. 1265-44), or in any case law cited that supports the district court's Ruling (R. 
1042) that BYU can execute upon the non-party stockholder's assets. 
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The district court's May, 2002 Ruling, the resulting Judgment, and the July 10 Supplemental 
Order are all void and were entered against non-parties in violation of their due process rights. 
II. THE JULY 10, 2002 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER IS 
VOID AND SHOULD BE VACATED BY THIS COURT 
Without lengthy discussion, we adopt TREMCO'S conclusion that regardless of whether the 
July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order is, or is not, an appealable order or is now being appealed, this 
Court's knowledge and understanding of that "Supplemental Order" is necessary to understand how 
BYU has misused the TREMCO litigation and the June 13, 2002 Summary Judgment to bootstrap 
itself into an order authorizing execution upon the individual assets of the non-parties without even 
any pretense of due process, the right to be named, receive process, or right to assert claims of 
defenses and be heard. (See B YU's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. Supp. 54.) 
All of the district court's rulings and "findings" are void against these non-parties and their 
assets. Regardless of how this Court may view the respective claims between BYU and TREMCO, 




This Court should disregard BYU's efforts to support its theories and the district court's 
judgments. The May, 2002 Ruling, the June 13, 2002 Summary Judgment, and the resulting July 
10, 2002 Supplemental Order are void and unenforceable against Duncan, et aL, and should be 
reversed and vacated. 
Y ^ 
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